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I. How Many Levels ? 
 
Semantics is in the business of systematically assigning meaningful contents to sentences and 
other complex expressions, on the basis of a prior assignment of content to the constituent 
expressions. The contents assigned to natural language sentences are supposed to account for 
their role in communication. 
In the theory of communication, however, another notion of content comes into play : 
the psychological notion of the content of an attitude such as belief. Speakers attempt to 
communicate the content of their beliefs by saying what they say, and they say what they say 
by uttering sentences with certain meanings. This raises a central meta-semantic issue : what 
exactly is the relation between the notion of content used in belief-desire psychology 
(including the theory of communication) and the notion of content or meaning applied to 
expressions of the language ? What relation is there between the content of the belief which 
the speaker attempts to communicate and the content of the sentence she utters ? 
 The meta-semantic question has a simple answer, it seems. By uttering a sentence 
which means that p, the speaker expresses her belief that p, and if all goes well she manages 
to communicate that belief to the hearer. So there is a single entity which is both the content 
of the belief (expressed by the speaker, and hopefully communicated to the hearer) and the 
content of the sentence. Cases in which the speaker does not believe what she says, or says 
one thing to communicate another, introduce complications which we may safely put aside, 
for they presuppose the normal case from which they depart in regular ways. 
 The entity which is both the content of a (declarative) sentence and the content of the 
corresponding belief is a proposition. What is important about propositions, however we 
analyse them, is that they are truth-bearers : they are true or false. Beliefs and sentences are 
truth-evaluable because they have contents (propositions) which are. That is the gist of what I 
will refer to as the Simple View : 
  
The Simple View 
The meaning of a sentence is a proposition, and doxastic attitudes themselves have propositions as 
contents. What a sentence expresses is something that can be believed (or disbelieved), and that can be 
evaluated for truth and falsity just as beliefs are. Communication exploits this feature : by uttering a 
sentence which means that p, one induces in the hearer the belief that p. 
 
The Simple View has been maintained for some time as a matter of idealization, but 
the pervasiveness of context-dependence in natural language soon led to a less simple view, 
popularized by David Kaplan : 
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The Two-Level View 
There are two levels of meaning for linguistic expressions: character and content. Character is determined 
by the grammar, and it determines content with respect to context. Content, in turn, determines truth-
value with respect to circumstances.  
 
The content of indexicals depends upon the context, and the context-independent meaning 
(the character) of the indexical is a rule of use that fixes its content with respect to context. ‘I’ 
refers to the speaker, ‘you’ to the adressee, ‘now’ to the time of utterance, and so on and so 
forth.  Once we have the character/content distinction for indexicals, we can extend it to all 
expressions. In some cases the distinction matters and in others it doesn’t. 
 On the Two-Level View, the proposition that is the content of an utterance is the 
content of the belief expressed (and communicated) by that utterance, but that is not the same 
thing as the linguistic meaning of the sentence. Linguistic meaning determines content with 
respect to context, and it is the content of the utterance, not its character, that corresponds to 
the content of the belief and can be communicated. 
There is a complication, however. The content of an utterance, Kaplan says, is a 
function from circumstances to truth-values. Now circumstances include times as well as 
worlds, for Kaplan. Kaplanian contents are therefore not propositions in the standard sense, 
but (in some cases at least) temporal propositions à la Prior. A temporal proposition (e.g. the 
proposition that Socrates is sitting) is not true or false absolutely, but only at a given time. 
Now there is an ongoing debate over the question, whether or not temporal propositions can 
be believed and communicated. If they cannot, as many authors hold, then kaplanian content 
is not the level of content we need to bridge the gap between semantics and belief-desire 
psychology. If the content of an utterance is a temporal proposition, and such propositions 
cannot be the content of belief, then we need to distinguish the content of the belief from the 
content of the utterance, in addition to distinguishing the content of the utterance from its 
linguistic meaning. 
Some philosophers say that temporal propositions are the content of temporal belief. 
Hintikka ascribes to Aristotle and the Stoics the view ‘that one and the same temporally 
indefinite form of words [e.g. ‘it is raining’, or ‘Socrates is sitting’] expresses one and the 
same belief or opinon at the different times when it is uttered’ (Hintikka 1973 : 85). On this 
view, elaborated by Arthur Prior, the content of a temporal thought is a temporal proposition 
— a property of times which the thinker ascribes to the time of thought. The thought is true 
simpliciter if and only if the temporal proposition is true at the time of thought. The (absolute) 
truth-conditions of such a thought depends upon a feature of the context, namely the time of 
thought, but instead of contributing to the determination of content what the context 
determines is the relevant point of evaluation. A similar view has gained currency recently to 
deal with first person thoughts. According to Lewis’ well-known theory of the de se, the 
content of a first person thought such as ‘I am thirsty’ is not a classical proposition but a 
property which the subject (or rather : the subject-at-a-time) self-ascribes (Lewis 1979). The 
subject now features as an aspect of the circumstance of evaluation, alongside the world and 
the time. 
Other philosophers point out that these relativized propositions (temporal propositions 
or first person propositions) cannot be the content of belief (Richard 1981, Stalnaker 1981). 
Consider the temporal case first. Beliefs may be retained over time. The subject who believes, 
at t, that Socrates is sitting, may retain that belief at a later time t’. What he believes at t’ if he 
has retained the initial belief is the proposition that Socrates was sitting then (at t). That is a 
classical proposition, and it was already believed at t when the subject initially thought 
‘Socrates is sitting’. Both at t and at t’, the subject believes of t that it bears the simultaneity 
relation to a sitting-episode whose agent is Socrates. When we retain a temporal belief, 
therefore, what we keep believing is not the temporal proposition, but the classical proposition 
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jointly determined by the temporal proposition and the time of evaluation provided by the 
initial context. 
If the subject, instead of retaining the belief, gives it up and changes his mind, there 
must be a content (a proposition) which is first believed and later disbelieved. In other words, 
there must be two propositions P1 and P2 such that (i) the subject believes P1 at t, (ii) the 
subject believes P2 at t’, and (iii) P1 and P2 are contradictory propositions. Now which 
proposition is believed at t’ by the subject who comes to realize he was mistaken when, at an 
earlier time t, he thought ‘Socrates is sitting’ ? The proposition he believes at t’ is the 
proposition that Socrates was not sitting at t. That proposition contradicts the proposition 
which the subject believed at t : that Socrates was sitting then. The subject now disbelieves 
that proposition, which he once believed. 
Shifting to de se belief, we see that the same considerations apply. When I tell you that 
I am thirsty, the information you get is that I am thirsty. If the content communicated was the 
first person proposition which Lewis takes to be the content of de se belief, the trusting hearer 
would, by accepting that proposition, self-ascribe the property of being thirsty. Many 
conclude that even in the case of de se thoughts, what is communicated by the speaker who 
expresses such a thought has got to be a proposition in the classical sense. So the true content 
of an indexical belief, these philosophers conclude, is a classical proposition, as per the 
standard view which Prior and Lewis mistakenly departed from. 
What this debate shows, I believe, is that we actually need two levels of content for the 
attitudes : the internal content (a ‘relativized’ proposition) and a more objective content (a 
classical proposition). The internal content is meant to capture the ‘state of mind’ (as Hintikka 
puts it) which is common to all those who think ‘Socrates is sitting’. As Perry emphasized, 
that state of mind accounts for behaviour, and we need to make room for it in our theory of 
the attitudes. But we need also an objective level of content determined in part by the context, 
in order to capture the (absolute) truth-conditions of the thought, and thereby account for 
disagreement, communication and change of mind. The internal content, plus the context 
(which provides the point of evaluation), determines a classical proposition, true iff the 
relativized proposition is true at the point of evaluation. That proposition is the objective 
content. 
In the case of utterances too we need two levels. Besides the character/content 
distinction, another distinction is forced upon us by Kaplan’s claim that the kaplanian content 
is a temporal proposition. We need to distinguish that proposition from the full assertoric 
content carried by the utterance when evaluated at a given time (provided by the context). 
When the subject says ‘it is raining’ at t, his utterance is true iff it is raining at t. The classical 
proposition that it is raining at t is the assertoric content, distinct from the kaplanian content 
(the temporal proposition that it is raining, a proposition true at an arbitrary time t’ just in case 
it is raining at that time). 
The full assertoric content of an utterance is a function of both its kaplanian content 
and the relevant point of evaluation. It is thus doubly context-dependent. As Kaplan points 
out, the context comes into play twice in semantic evaluation : it fixes the content of 
indexicals, thereby generating kaplanian content, and it fixes the circumstance with respect to 
which the content of the sentence is to be evaluated, thereby generating assertoric content. 
Character,  plus context, gives us the kaplanian content ; the kaplanian content, plus context, 
gives us the full assertoric content : the classical proposition whose truth the subject commits 
herself to. The Two-Level View has now given way to a Three-Level View, which is my 
rendering of Kaplan’s ideas1 : 
                                                 
1
  Kaplan himself does not single out what I call ‘assertoric content’, but his framework 
makes room for this notion. 
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The Three-Level View 
Character determines kaplanian content with respect to context ; kaplanian content, in turn, determines 
assertoric content, again with respect to context. Assertoric contents are propositions in the classical 
sense : they can be believed across time and communicated. 
 
Several issues arise with respect to the Three-Level View. First, how do the levels of 
content we need for semantic purposes (kaplanian content and assertoric content) map to the 
levels of content we need for the theory of thought ? Given the parallelism between the two-
factor analyses provided for language and thought, it is tempting to take the kaplanian content 
of a sentence to be the same thing as the internal content of the thought expressed by that 
sentence. In both cases, the assertoric content (of the utterance, or of the thought) depends 
upon selecting the right point of evaluation for the content. But equating kaplanian content 
(for utterances) and internal content (for thoughts) raises a difficulty in connection with 
indexical sentences like ‘I am thirsty’. In Kaplan’s framework the indexical ‘I’ contributes its 
reference to the content. According to Lewis, however, the subject features in the 
circumstance of evaluation and the content of the thought is only the property being thirsty, 
which the subject self-ascribes in the process of evaluating the content at the contextually 
relevant point. If Lewis and Kaplan are both right, the content of the sentence can’t be the 
same thing as the content of the thought. So we are faced with a decision. We must either give 
up Kaplan’s theory of indexicals, or give up Lewis’ theory of de se thought, or give up the 
principle that the content of an utterance is the content of the thought it expresses.
2
 
In a paper discussing Kaplan’s framework (Lewis 1980), Lewis raises another issue. 
Reformulated in terms of the Three-Level View, the issue is this. Kaplanian content is an 
intermediate level of content, between linguistic meaning (character) and full-fledged 
assertoric content. To get from linguistic meaning to kaplanian content we need to 
contextually assign values to the indexicals, and to get from kaplanian content to full 
assertoric content we need to select the right point of evaluation for the kaplanian content. But 
is there a real need for the intermediate step? 
What we do need for semantic purposes is a level of ‘semantic value’ that is 
compositional, that is, such that the semantic value of a complex expression (possibly a 
sentence) is a function of the semantic values of its immediate constituents and the syntax. 
Kaplan and Lewis both pointed out that the semantic value of a sentence can’t be its assertoric 
content (Kaplan 1989a, Lewis 1980).
3
 If I say ‘it is raining’ at t, the assertoric content of my 
utterance is the proposition that it is raining at t. If the assertoric content of a sentence s is its 
compositional semantic value, then if we embed s in a more complex sentence s’, the 
semantic value of s’ will be a function of, inter alia, the assertoric content of s. But that is not 
what we find. If, instead of uttering ‘it is raining’ in isolation at t, I were to embed it under a 
temporal operator (e.g. under ‘in 2050 at this very hour and place it will be the case that’), the 
resulting sentence would have a content that is not a function of the assertoric content of ‘it is 
raining’ (the proposition that it is raining at t). When I say ‘in 2050 at this very hour and place 
                                                 
2
 Considerations pertaining to communication support the latter option : several authors in the 
debate over ‘centered communication’ have given up the so-called ‘mind to speech’ principle, 
according to which the content of the utterance is the content of the thought it expresses. (For 
a survey, see Recanati forthcoming b.) 
3
 This is similar to Dummett’s distinction between ‘assertoric content’ and ‘ingredient sense’ 
(see e.g. Dummett 1973 : 446-47 ; 1981 : 572-74; 1993 : 47-50 ; see also Evans 1979 and 
Forbes 1989). The need to distinguish assertoric content from semantic value has been 
emphasized in the recent meta-semantic literature (see Ninan 2010, Rabern 2012, and Yalcin 
2014) ; this chapter is my contribution to that trend (see the conclusion). 
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it will be the case that it is raining’ the time t drops out of the picture and the temporal 
proposition that it is raining is evaluated at a time determined by the temporal index-shifter in 
the embedding sentence. The time of utterance, t, comes into the picture when the act of 
asserting the sentence takes place, but that act does not take place when the sentence is 
embedded. It follows that the content of the embedding sentence is not a function of the (time-
specific) assertoric content of the embedded sentence. We need something else than assertoric 
content to play the role of (compositional) semantic value for sentences. 
Kaplanian contents are a candidate for that role – they are supposed to be the semantic 
values of sentences in context and to obey the compositionality constraint. (Indeed, the need 
to satisfy the compositionality constrained is the main reason adduced by Kaplan for 
construing kaplanian contents as temporal propositions.) But Lewis 1980 argued that the 
intermediate level of kaplanian content can actually be dispensed with if, without otherwise 
changing the theory, we take sentence meanings to be functions from context-and-
circumstance to truth-value (rather than as functions from contexts to functions from 
circumstances to truth-values). On Lewis’ equivalent story we end up with only two levels : 
sentence meaning (Lewisian semantic value) and assertoric content. 
These issues are best seen as related. As Stalnaker puts it, positing middlemen (as 
Kaplan does) is worthwile only if they have some extra work to do. Here the extra work is 
presumably made necessary by the need to connect the theory of language to the theory of 
thought and communication. We need to work out the connection before we can adjudicate 
the debate between Kaplan and Lewis.
4
 For the time being, however, I want to focus on an 
assumption shared by all the views I have considered so far : 
 
The Determination Thesis 
Linguistic meaning as determined by grammar determines assertoric/doxastic content, either in zero step 
(linguistic meaning is content), or in one step (character or Lewisian semantic value determines content) 
or in two steps (character determines kaplanian content which determines assertoric content). 
 
I think the Determination Thesis cannot be maintained, and I will argue this point by looking 
at a much debated case : that of demonstratives. 
 
II. Rejecting the Determination Thesis 
 
As is well-known, demonstratives (including pronouns on their demonstrative uses) behave 
differently than what Kaplan calls ‘pure indexicals’. Pure indexicals are associated with a rule 
which fixes the reference in context, e.g. the rule that ‘I’ refers to the speaker. For 
demonstratives such as ‘that’ or ‘she’, there is no such rule. The speaker is free to refer to 
whatever he wants, within limits (the reference has to satisfy the presuppositions encoded by 
the expression). Thus ‘she’ may refer to any female person the speaker has in mind. The 
absence of a linguistic rule of reference makes it necessary for the speaker to indicate to the 
audience what he is talking about, via a ‘demonstration’ (Kaplan 1989a) which reveals his 
‘directing intention’ (Kaplan 1989b). The demonstration may take any form (pointing, 
direction of gaze, etc.), and it may be unnecessary if the context makes it clear what the 
speaker is referring to. 
In the interest of unification, it has been suggested that demonstratives too are 
associated with a rule of reference (a ‘character’), but one that acknowledges the role of the 
demonstration. On this view a demonstrative refers to what the speaker ‘demonstrates’ — 
that’s the linguistic rule. This extension of the notion of character to demonstratives may or 
                                                 
4
  See the conclusion, for an argument that the middlemen (Kaplanian contents) play a 
role in the theory of assertion. 
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may not be acceptable, depending on the theoretical project one is pursuing. If what is at stake 
is the Determination Thesis, the extension is suspicious and I think it should be resisted. 
One should not attempt to save the Determination Thesis (according to which 
grammatical meaning determines content) by arguing that demonstratives, too, have a 
character which determines their content. Arguing in that way would be ‘cheating’ (Recanati 
2001) because the alleged determination works only if the reference is already determined by 
the demonstration. The role of the demonstration in the alleged rule of reference establishes 
that what actually determines reference is the speaker’s intention (provided that intention is 
made manifest to the hearer via the demonstration). But if it is the speaker’s intention, it is not 
the grammatical meaning of the demonstrative that fixes the reference.  On the suggested 
proposal, grammatical meaning fixes reference but does so only redundantly. That is not the 
sense of ‘determination’ that matters to the Determination Thesis. The Thesis cannot be saved 
by arguing that the linguistic meaning of the demonstrative (the rule that it refers to what the 
speaker demonstrates) redundantly determines its pre-determined referent. 
 I will return to the ‘cheating’ objection in a moment. First, however, we must consider 
the prima facie problem which demonstratives raise for Kaplan’s theory of indexicals, based 
on the notion of character, and the two responses which Kaplan himself considered in 
reaction to that problem. 
Characters, for Kaplan, are functions from contexts to contents, and the content of an 
indexical is the object it refers to (or a constant function to that object). Since the character of 
an indexical is its linguistic meaning — a property of the expression-type — two occurrences 
of the same indexical in the same context are bound to refer to the same thing. But that is not 
what we find with demonstratives. Two occurrences of the same demonstrative (type) in one 
and the same sentence (uttered in a given context) may refer to distinct objects and thus carry 
different contents. Thus an utterance of ‘That is F but that is not F’, or of ‘That is not identical 
to that’, may be true — if the two occurrences of ‘that’ refer to distinct objects. No such thing 
is possible with pure indexicals such as ‘I’ or ‘yesterday’. Sentences like (3) and (4) below are 
false in every context. 
It follows that Kaplan’s theory of indexicals does not immediately apply to 
demonstratives. In contrast to pure indexicals, demonstratives do not possess a character in 
virtue of being of a certain type. Only occurrences of a given demonstrative type 
(accompanied by a suitable demonstration/directing intention) carry a character. Because, for 
demonstratives, characters are associated with occurrences and not directly with the 
expression-type, two occurrences of the same demonstrative type may carry distinct 
characters, and determine different contents in the same context. Kaplan therefore puts 
forward the following theory for demonstratives : 
 
Kaplan on Demonstratives (1) : the Hybrid Theory 
Demonstratives are incomplete. They do not have a character unless they are completed by a 
‘demonstration’. Only the pair <demonstrative, demonstration> has a full-fledged character.5 
 
I call Kaplan’s first theory the ‘hybrid theory’ because it is similar to Frege’s theory of 
‘hybrid proper names’ (Künne 1992, Textor 2007). For Frege it’s not the indexical as 
expression type, but the linguistic expression together with some aspect of the context of 
utterance, which has sense. In an ideal language the same expression type will always carry 
the same sense, but in languages with demonstratives that is clearly not the case. With respect 
to such languages, we must distinguish between the linguistic, conventional meaning of a 
                                                 
5
  I abstract from the ‘separability’ issue, which Kaplan discusses at length but which is 
orthogonal to the present discussion. 
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demonstrative (type) and the character of an occurrence of that demonstrative (paired with an 
appropriate demonstration).  
Most important for a logic of demonstratives, it is not irrational to hold ‘that is F but 
that is not F’, or ‘That is not identical to that’, even if the two occurrences of the 
demonstrative ‘that’ refer to the same object. That is not irrational because that is not 
internally inconsistent (inconsistent for the subject who holds the thought or, in Kaplan’s 
framework, inconsistent at the level of character). Internal inconsistency arises only if the 
same demonstration or directing intention is associated with the two occurrences of the 
demonstrative. If we use subscripts to represent the associated demonstrations, there will be a 
difference in character between 
 
(1) he1 is F but he1 is not F 
 
and 
 
(2) he1 is F but he2 is not F 
 
In virtue of its character, (1) is bound to yield an inconsistent content : whatever the context, 
(1) says that one and the same object is and is not F. This is like the automatic inconsistency 
we get if we substitute a pure indexical for the demonstrative : 
 
(3) Yesterday was F but yesterday was not F 
(4) I am F but I am not F 
 
As I said already, these sentences are false in every context. But (2) is not inconsistent at the 
level of character. In (2), ‘he1’ and ‘he2’ may corefer, but whether or not they do depends 
upon the context. Their coreference can only be de facto, not de jure. In some contexts the 
character of (2) will determine an inconsistent content (if ‘he1’ and ‘he2’ turn out to corefer), 
but in other contexts it will determine a content that is true. Placing character at the level of 
occurrences rather than expression-types therefore makes it possible to distinguish two 
possible readings for a sentence like ‘He is French but he is not French’, one which is 
internally inconsistent and one which isn’t.6 (This solves Gauker’s dilemma: see Gauker 
2014, 292.) 
Kaplan’s theory introduces a distinction between the linguistic, conventional meaning 
of a demonstrative (type) and the character of an occurrence of that demonstrative (paired 
with an appropriate demonstration). Since linguistic meaning (a property of expression types) 
is no longer equated to character (a property of occurrences), we now get a four-level picture : 
 
The Four-Level View 
Linguistic meaning, together with the required demonstrations, determines character ; character, 
together with context, determines kaplanian content ; kaplanian content, together with context, 
determines assertoric content. 
 
                                                 
6
  See Fiengo and May 1994. Kaplan would handle this case differently. He takes 
pronouns to be fundamentally ambiguous (Kaplan 1989b : 572), and would argue that the 
second occurrence of ‘he’ in (1) is anaphoric, not demonstrative. As he puts it, ‘every new 
syntactic occurrence of a true demonstrative requires not just a referent-determining intention, 
but a new referent-determining intention’ (Kaplan 1989b : 588). 
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This may be a little too much, and one may be tempted to preserve the equation ‘linguistic 
meaning = character’. This can be done in two ways, one of which corresponds to Kaplan’s 
second theory. 
First, we can take the context relative to which demonstratives are interpreted to be so 
fine-grained that every syntactic occurrence of a demonstrative is associated with a distinct 
context. I have myself put forward a theory according to which the context relevant to the 
interpretation of an expression is not the context c in which the sentence in which the 
expression occurs is uttered, but the sub-context c’ in which the expression itself (but not the 
rest of the sentence) is uttered.
7
 On this view, if a sentence with two occurrences of the same 
demonstrative is uttered in c, what is relevant to the semantic value of the demonstratives (the 
argument to the character function) is not the context c but the sub-context c’ in which the 
demonstrative, but not the rest of the sentence, is uttered. The two occurrences end up being 
evaluated with respect to distinct contexts, so they can refer to distinct objects. This analysis 
is inspired both by the Reichenbachian notion of ‘token-reflexivity’ and by the idea that the 
context ‘continually shifts’ (Stalnaker) as the  utterance proceeds. If the context can shift 
intra-sententially, there is no reason why two occurrences of the same demonstrative in a 
sentence could not be interpreted with respect to different contexts.
8
 
This view seems to take us away from a semantics of occurrences into a semantics of 
utterances — the sort of thing Kaplan wants to resist (Kaplan 1989b : 584-85).9 But there is 
another way in which we can preserve the equation linguistic meaning = character, which 
does not involve any significant departure from Kaplan’s framework. 
Let us construe the demonstrated objects themselves as aspects of the context, on 
which the kaplanian content depends. If we enrich the context that serves as argument to the 
character function with a full assignment of demonstrata, we can maintain that two 
occurrences of the same demonstrative type have the same character even though they may 
refer to distinct objects in the same context. That is the gist of Kaplan’s second theory of 
demonstratives : 
 
Kaplan on Demonstratives (2) : the Indexical Theory 
As expression-types, demonstratives have a character (fixed by the rules of the language). The character 
of a demonstrative determines its content with respect to a specific contextual parameter : that of the 
object demonstrated. The n-
th
 demonstrative in a sentence refers to the n-
th
 item in the sequence of 
demonstrated objects that features in the context for that sentence. 
 
On this theory, two occurrences of the same demonstrative may determine distinct 
referents in the same context not because the occurrences do not share the same character, nor 
because the context shifts between one occurrence and the next, but because the context 
which is the argument to the character function includes an assignment of objects to each of 
the occurrences of the demonstrative. The context now contains something that, for each 
occurrence of a demonstrative, determines what that occurrence refers to. For each occurrence 
of the demonstrative, the character of the demonstrative (fixed once for all by the rules of the 
language) and the context (which now contains an assignment of object to each 
                                                 
7
  ‘I assume that if a complex expression * is used in a context c, each of its 
constituents is used in a sub-part of c, for example  in c1 and  in c2’ (Recanati 2010 : 44). 
8
  Several authors, such as Braun (1996) and Rabern (2014), take demonstratives 
themselves to shift, or update, the context. 
9
  See Garcia-Carpintero (1998) and Perry (2012) for a defence of utterance-based 
semantics. Salmon (2006) assigns semantic values not to expressions in isolation but to 
expressions in a linguistic environment. This seems to achieve the required desired fine-
grainedness of context, without moving to an utterance-based semantics. 
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demonstrative) fix the content of each occurrence of the demonstrative in the sentence : that 
content, for each occurrence, is the object assigned to that occurrence in the context. 
This theory amounts to feeding an assignment function into the context. Formally this 
is fine, but in the context of the present discussion (about the Determination Thesis) the 
theory raises the objection I mentioned above. The issue we are concerned with is whether 
grammatical meaning determines content. One cannot argue that it does, simply because the 
aspects of content which grammatical meaning does not determine can be (pre-semantically) 
fed into the context that serves as argument to the character function. 
Putting the demonstrated object into the context, as Kaplan’s indexical theory does, 
violates a constraint on contextual parameters which Brandom formulates as follows (by 
‘semantic indices’ Brandom means ‘contextual parameters’): 
 
Brandom’s constraint 
What I want to call ‘genuine’ semantic indices are features of utterances that can be read 
off without knowing anything about what the utterance means. Time, place, speaker, and 
possible world are properties of tokenings that can be settled and specified before one 
turns one’s attention to the content expressed by those tokenings. (…) [They] can be 
determined independently of [the context-sensitive expression’s] semantic value and then 
appealed to as input from which the value could then be computed by a character-
function. (Brandom 2008 : 58) 
 
According to Brandom, the contextual parameters on which content depends must be 
properties of tokenings that can be determined independently of content — independently of 
what the speaker is saying. Because they are used to determine content, the contextual 
parameters themselves cannot depend upon the content. But in the case of demonstratives, 
analysed as per Kaplan’s indexical theory, the relevant contextual feature (the object referred 
to by the speaker) is the content we are after ! This, Brandom suggests, is circular. 
Let me spell out the objection. The idea that indexicals have characters which 
determine their content in context suggests a procedure whereby a language user can access 
the content of an utterance, by grasping the rule (the character function) and applying it to the 
context at hand. But in the case of demonstratives, the content an interpreter is trying to 
determine (the referent of the demonstrative) is fed into the context so it must be already be 
accessible in order to apply the character function. We must understand what or who the 
speaker is talking about (‘speaker’s reference’) in order to understand what the demonstrative, 
in the speaker’s mouth, refers to. But that means that the grammatical meaning of the 
demonstrative type does not determine the reference of the demonstrative in context.
10
 It 
constrains the reference (which has to satisfy the presuppositions encoded by e.g. gender or 
number features), but what actually (i.e. non-redundantly) determines the reference is 
something else than grammatical meaning : it is speaker’s meaning. 
Speaker’s meaning assigns referents to each occurrence of the demonstrative. Feeding 
the assignment into the context is formally ok but cannot rescue the idea that grammatical 
meaning determines content in the face of the demonstrative counterexamples. Semantic 
reference for demonstratives piggybacks on speaker’s reference. Only if this is fully 
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  Kent Bach and Stephen Neale have repeatedly complained that ‘determination’ (in my 
work and the work of others) is ambiguous between a metaphysical and an epistemological 
sense. But even though my talk of procedure is epistemological, my point about 
‘determination’ applies across the board, which is why I don’t care so much about the 
distinction. 
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acknowledged is the formal move (putting the assignment function into the context) 
theoretically acceptable.
11
 
A meta-theoretic argument in favour of Kaplan’s indexical theory is that it unifies 
demonstratives and pure indexicals by assigning them all a character modeled after the 
character of pure indexicals. But the argument is not compelling, because the unification can 
proceed in the other direction as well. We may start with demonstratives, where speaker’s 
reference determines semantic reference, and extend the analysis to pure indexicals. 
The presuppositional approach to indexical reference discussed in Schlenker 2005a 
takes the pure indexicals to be a limiting case of a demonstrative. A third person pronoun like 
‘he’ or ‘she’ semantically refers to the speaker’s reference, whatever it is, provided it satisfies 
the (meager) presupposition carried by the pronoun. In the case of a pure indexical like the 
first person pronoun ‘I’ the presupposition is much more specific — so specific that it is 
uniquely identifying. The referent of ‘I’ must be the speaker (the person making the 
utterance). Here, in contrast to the third person case, the presupposition is satisfied by a 
unique object. The general rule for the interpretation of pronouns still applies, however: the 
semantic reference is the value of the (speaker-referential) contextual assignment, provided it 
satisfies the presupposition. 
If, with ‘I’, the speaker refers to an object which does not satisfy the presupposition, 
the occurrence of ‘I’ fails to semantically refer. Schlenker says that examples are difficult to 
find, because ‘in general one has a clear idea who one is trying to refer to when one utters the 
pronoun I.’ Here is a putative example. Imagine that I am watching a film in which I 
(wrongly) think I recognize myself, and that I say, pointing to the character on the screen 
which I take to be myself: ‘Look, my pants are on fire!’ I refer to the character on the screen, 
which I take to be myself, and since that individual (whose pants are on fire) is not myself, the 
presupposition carried by ‘I’ is not satisfied and the occurrence fails to refer semantically. 
Schlenker gives a similar example involving the pronoun ‘you’: 
 
Suppose that I am pointing towards one person (say, to my right) while talking to 
another person (to my left). If I then utter You are nice with emphasis on you and a 
correlative pointing gesture, the result is decidedly odd — in the same way as if, 
pointing towards John, I were to say: She is nice. This is a welcome result: a 
presupposition failure is predicted because the person that is pointed to is not an 
addressee of the speech act (similarly, she is nice is odd when pointing to John 
because she carries a presupposition that it denotes a female individual). (Schlenker 
2005a : 162) 
 
To sum up, we may unify the theory of indexicals and demonstratives either by 
extending to demonstratives the kaplanian model of the pure indexicals whose linguistic 
meaning is a character (a function from contexts to contents), or by extending to pure 
indexicals the model of demonstratives as free-variable-like expressions whose content results 
from a contextual assignment of speaker’s reference (under constraints). Either way, we must 
acknowledge the difference between pure indexicals and demonstratives. While putting 
forward the indexical theory, Kaplan says that it ‘still allows us to distinguish the true 
demonstratives from the pure indexicals. The parameters for the latter are brute facts of the 
context, like location and time,’ while the parameter for demonstratives is a contextual 
assignment of speaker’s referents (Kaplan 1989b : 588). The presuppositional theorist also has 
to acknowledge the fact that, with pure indexicals, the speaker’s reference is redundant in the 
                                                 
11
  Kaplan accepts the primacy of speaker’s reference for demonstratives, so his version 
of the indexical theory is beyond reproach. 
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sense that the presupposition carried by the expression is (already) uniquely identifying. The 
speaker’s reference cannot affect the semantic reference, which is pre-determined 
linguistically, but only determines whether or not the expression carries semantic reference 
(in the presuppositional framework, the expression refers — carries semantic value — only if 
the object the presupposition determines is the same as the speaker’s referent.)  
According to Schlenker (2005a), the theory that treats both demonstrative and 
indexical pronouns as free variables associated with presuppositions has an advantage over 
Kaplan’s indexical theory which treats them as having characters which (redundantly or non-
redundantly) determine their reference. Through the postulation of the variable it makes it 
possible to account for various binding phenomena , which Kaplan’s theory leaves 
unexplained.  
Binding phenomena have also been invoked to criticize Kaplan’s theory, on the 
grounds that kaplanian contents cannot play the role of compositional semantic values. In ‘he 
is tall’, Rabern (2012) points out, the kaplanian content involves the value of the contextual 
assignment of a particular individual to the pronoun ‘he’. But that value drops out of the 
picture entirely if the sentence is inserted in a quantificational environment and the pronoun 
bound : ‘everyonei believes that hei is tall’. This raises a problem if we want to maintain that 
kaplanian contents are compositional semantic values. The kaplanian content of ‘he is tall’ is 
a singular proposition with the reference of ‘he’ as a constituent, but the compositional 
semantic value of the sentence, which may occur both in isolation and embedded, must 
abstract from the reference the pronoun takes when uttered in isolation (see Salmon 2006 for 
similar remarks). 
Rabern appeals to the Dummett-Evans-Lewis distinction between semantic value and 
assertoric content, and argues that the reference of free-variable-like expressions (e.g. 
demonstratives) belongs to the level of assertoric content, not to that of semantic value. The 
compositional semantic value of a variable is not the value assigned to that variable (or a 
constant function to that value), as Kaplan says, but a non-constant function from assignments 
to values. Rabern concludes that, ‘where compositionality is concerned, it was a mistake for 
Kaplan to put the assignment function in the context rather than in the index’ (Rabern 2012, n. 
32). Kaplan explicitly construes the reference of free variables as a determinant of semantic 
value, rather than merely as a determinant of assertoric content. He writes : ‘The assignment, 
as I am arguing we should conceive of it, is not ‘evaluating’ the variable at a world, rather it is 
generating an element of content, and it is the content which is then evaluated at a world’ 
(Kaplan 1989b : 591). But for Rabern, the reference of a demonstrative is given by the 
assignment that is part of the index (the point of evaluation), so the reference only belongs to 
the level of assertoric content. It does not belong to the sort of content we need for 
compositionality purposes (what Dummett calls ‘ingredient sense’).  
It is to be noted that Schlenker himself puts the assignment function into the index, in 
the form of a sequence of evaluation containing the discourse participants and the various 
objects of discourse.
12
 Demonstratives and other referential expressions manipulate the 
sequence, by adding the speaker’s referent on top of it. Anaphoric pronouns and pure 
indexical like ‘I’ work differently – they pick up a pre-existing element of the sequence and 
move it to the top of the sequence. 
These views suggest that the semantic value of a sentence is not a classical 
proposition, not even a temporal proposition, but a property of richer indices. This takes us 
close to Lewis’ theory of centered content ; a good result if we want the theory of thought 
(which was Lewis’ primary concern) to mesh with semantics. If Rabern and Schlenker are 
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 ‘In our system, predicates are true at a sequence in the same way that in propositional 
modal logic a proposition is true at a world’ (Schlenker 2005b : 5n). 
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right, the rich index includes a sequence of objects. In the centered worlds literature, several 
authors have similarly argued that thought contents should be multi-centered, which means 
that the index ought to include what Ninan (2008) calls a res-sequence — a sequence of 
objects (see also Torre 2010 for a similar view). The internal content of the thought and the 
sentence’s semantic value now come out similar, and this opens up interesting perspectives 
for the theory of how thought connects to language. 
As far as the main issue of this section — the Determination Thesis — is concerned, it 
does not matter where one puts the assignment function — in the index or in the context. 
What matters is that to reach assertoric content we need to appeal to speaker’s reference, thus 
injecting a dose of speaker’s meaning into the semantic machinery. There is no alternative 
way to assign contextual values to demonstratives — no ‘brute fact of the context’ (Kaplan 
1989b : 588) can do the job. This applies not only to the assignment of contextual values to 
demonstratives, but also to the assignment of contextual values to so-called ‘contextual 
expressions’ (Clark 1992), and more generally to all free variables in logical form.13 More 
important, these considerations apply just as well to the contextual selection of a particular 
index of evaluation for the expressed content. 
In Kaplan’s 3-level picture, the context comes into play twice, first to determine the 
kaplanian content (2
nd
 level ) and then to determine the circumstance with respect to which 
that content is to be evaluated (3rd level). Now what determines the relevant circumstance in 
context ? This is entirely a matter of speaker’s meaning. If I say ‘It is raining’, the place with 
respect to which the place-neutral content of the utterance is to be evaluated need not be the 
place of utterance. In general, the circumstance of evaluation need not be the the 
‘circumstance of the context’. It is a circumstance determined by the speaker’s intention 
(modulo the usual restrictions). So if we follow Rabern et al. and construe the sequence of 
evaluation as part of the index, we haven’t in the least diminished the need to acknowledge 
the crucial role of speaker’s meaning in determining assertoric content. 
 
III. Semantic Entry Points for Speaker’s Meaning 
 
I have argued that grammatical meaning does not determine assertoric content, but merely 
constrains it. Speaker’s meaning necessarily comes into play. Here, I am concerned with the 
extent of the phenomenon. When and where, exactly, does speaker’s meaning come into the 
picture ? 
As we have just seen, demonstrative reference is a case in point. But what is true of 
demonstrative reference can be extended to reference in general. I have argued elsewhere that 
a referential expression (any referential expression) inherits its reference from an associated 
‘mental file’. If that is right, then all reference is speaker’s reference.14 Josh Dever also argued 
for this view in his dissertation, and Hawthorne and Manley come to similar conclusions in 
their recent book (Hawthorne and Manley 2012). 
The second area in which, arguably, speaker’s meaning comes into play to fix 
assertoric content is quantification. There is no quantification without an implicit domain of 
quantification, that is, without a speaker-meant restriction on the domain of quantification. 
The restriction may be empty, but that is only a special case — the case in which the selected 
domain is the ‘universal’ domain, assuming there is such a thing. 
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  In his dissertation (Dever 1998), Josh Dever argued that all referential expressions are 
free variables in logical form, endowed with speaker’s reference at the level of assertoric 
content. 
14
  This does not mean that we lose the speaker’s reference/semantic reference 
distinction. See Recanati forthcoming a. 
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Hawthorne and Manley try to reduce the context-sensitivity of reference to the 
context-sensitivity of quantification. There is no reference in language, they speculate ; all 
reference is made through singular restrictions over the domain of quantification.
15
 In this 
way they simplify the theory : there is only one entry point for speaker’s meaning, that which 
is afforded by quantificational domain restriction. 
While acknowledging the elegance of the resulting theory, I find it implausible. 
Reference is a fundamental function in human speech, so it would be very strange (and in 
need of explanation) if reference was not somehow encoded in the language system (as it is, if 
we accept that there are referential expressions).
16
 Be that as it may, rather than trying to 
minimize the semantic entry points for speaker’s meaning, my inclination is to multiply them. 
The idea is that speech, in general, rests on speaker’s meaning, so that every basic speech 
function should be expected to display speaker-meaning-dependency. We have just 
considered two such basic functions (reference and quantification) and I am going to consider 
two others : assertion and predication.  
As Davidson (1979) emphasized, the assertive force of an utterance cannot be 
encoded, so assertion must be fundamentally a matter of speaker’s meaning. The notion of 
assertion (or the more general notion of force) is ambiguous, as Hare pointed out long time 
ago (Hare 1970), so let’s disambiguate the claim I have just made on behalf of Davidson. The 
type of speech act which a sentence is designed to perform (assertion vs order or question) is 
encoded through sentence mood and other indicators ; what cannot be encoded is whether or 
not the speaker is actually performing the encoded speech act. That the speaker is asserting (if 
she is) is something that can only be determined by considering the context and the speaker’s 
likely intentions.  
It might be objected that this is true but irrelevant. Force and content are distinct 
dimensions. It follows that the part played by speaker’s meaning at the speech act level (the 
level of force) does not establish that a similar part is played by speaker’s meaning at the level 
of content. According to the objection, it is misleading to present assertion as a semantic entry 
point for speaker’s meaning. Insofar as it is force-determining, speaker’s meaning does not 
affect semantic content at all. 
I acknowledge that, according to Fregean orthodoxy, force does not affect content ; but 
that cannot be presupposed in the present context without begging the question. In section II I 
argued that the utterance’s assertoric content depends upon the selected point of evaluation. 
The selection of the point of evaluation itself is a matter of force, as I am about to show. 
Assertion serves as a semantic entry-point for speaker’s meaning, on my view, because 
assertive force does affect assertoric content (contrary to Fregean orthodoxy). 
In the situation-theoretic framework inspired by Austin’s theory of truth, and assumed 
here, every utterance (or thought) is about a situation which it characterizes as being of a 
certain type. The utterance (or thought) is true if and only if the topic situation is of that type. 
Assertion consists in presenting the topic situation as being of that type, that is, in undertaking 
the commitment that it is of that type. I will use the situation-theoretic framework in the 
conclusion to make sense of Kaplan’s postulation of an intermediate level of content (the 
kaplanian content or, in my framework, the lekton). For the time being, I want to emphasize, 
first, that the situation an utterance is about is entirely a matter of speaker’s meaning. One and 
the same sentence can be evaluated against any situation. Second, at an intuitive level, the 
truth-conditions of the utterance depend upon the situation which is contextually selected as 
relevant. This gives rise to a generalized form of context-sensitivity. An utterance which says 
that p and concerns a situation s is true if and only if, in s, it is the case that p . Even if the 
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sentence is devoid of indexicals or other context-sensitive expression — even if it is an eternal 
sentence endowed with absolute truth-conditions and expressing a classical proposition — the 
truth-conditions of the utterance may vary more or less indefinitely because of the 
involvement of the topic situation. In such a case there are two propositions to consider : the 
internal proposition (the proposition that p, expressed by the sentence), and the ‘Austinian 
proposition’ that in s, it is the case that p. The Austinian proposition is the assertoric content : 
the speaker’s commitment is to the truth of the internal proposition (the proposition that p) 
when evaluated against the topic situation. 
Test cases for the distinction are provided by examples in which the truth-value of the 
Austinian proposition diverges from the truth-value of the ‘internal’ proposition (the lekton). 
An example from Barwise and Etchemendy, which I have used many times, illustrates such a 
divergence (Barwise and Etchemendy 1987 : 29). If, commenting on a poker scene I am 
watching, I say ‘Claire has a good hand now’, my utterance is intuitively false, or at least not 
true, if it turns out that Claire is not one of the players, contrary to my mistaken impression. 
But the proposition that Claire has a good hand now may well be literally true, if Claire turns 
out to be playing bridge across town and has a good hand at the time of speech. A proper 
theory of assertoric content has to acknowledge the Austinian proposition as the relevant level 
for normatively assessing the assertion as correct or incorrect. The utterance is incorrect 
because the target situation (the poker game I am watching) is not of the relevant type — it is 
not a situation in which Claire has a good hand (even though some other situation is). 
In Lewis’ theory of the de se, the content expressed by ‘I am thirsty’ is a property 
(being thirsty) which the subject self-ascribes. Self-ascription is a matter of force, in Lewis’ 
framework. To assert that one is thirsty is to self-ascribe the property of being thirsty. The 
self-ascription is not an element of content, for Lewis : the content is the property of being 
thirsty. Still, the full assertoric content of the utterance involves the subject. To evaluate the 
assertion as correct or incorrect we have to evaluate the content (the property) ‘at’ the subject 
who self-ascribes it. Suppose John is the self-ascriber. Then the utterance is true if and only if 
John is thirsty. The act of assertion (understood as self-ascription) fixes the relevant point of 
evaluation for the content, and thereby affects assertoric content. 
I conclude that assertion is a semantic entry point for speaker’s meaning. The 
speaker’s act of assertion comprises several ancillary acts, including the selection of a 
particular situation as ‘topic situation’. That ancillary act affects assertoric content, because 
the topic situation is a constituent in the Austinian proposition which is the utterance’s 
assertoric content ;
17
 or, in more neutral terms, because assertoric content is a function of the 
situation of evaluation targeted by the act of assertion. 
 The semantic entry points I have considered so far correspond to reference, 
quantification, and assertion. What about predication ? Is it, too, a semantic entry point for 
speaker’s meaning ? I think it is. 
By and large, twentieth-century philosophy of language has been guilty of ignoring the 
context sensitivity of predication. Only lip-service has been paid to the phenomenon of 
polysemy, considered as a form of ambiguity and therefore discarded as ‘pre-semantic’ (the 
properly semantic work of interpretation starts after a particular meaning has been selected). 
Note that there was a time when indexicality itself was considered a form of ambiguity (and 
discarded as pre-semantic). Indexicals were called ‘systematically ambiguous expressions’. 
Indexicality is now recognized for what it is (a form of context-sensitivity), and I believe it is 
time to move on and recognize that polysemy, too, is a form of context-sensivity.  
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proposition framework (where Austinian propositions are pairs of a possibly relativized 
proposition and a situation) ; but nothing hinges on this choice. 
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Contrary to a widespread assumption, lexical items of the predicative variety do not 
encode ready-made predicates to be delivered on demand. Some work is needed to get to 
predicates. Lexical items encode something more abstract and schematic — a conceptual 
structure, with ‘slots’, ‘variables’ or ‘roles’ to which particular values may/must be assigned. 
Fillmore calls such a conceptual structure a ‘frame’ (Fillmore 1982, 1985). I claim that the 
contribution which a given lexical item makes to content — the predicate it contributes in 
context —depends upon the assignment of values to the roles in the semantic frame associated 
with the lexical item. (Not all the roles in the frame are assigned values in the course of 
interpretation ; those that aren’t are existentially quantified.) 
As Fillmore emphasized, polysemy is not a feature of linguistic meaning itself : it is 
due to the fact that the meaning of a lexical item is, or involves, a semantic frame with 
argument roles. There are different ways to fill the roles of the frame in context, and this 
potentially generates different readings for the same expression. I am now going to illustrate 
that phenomenon. 
Consider the following three sentences, involving one and the same the lexical item 
(the adjective ‘safe’).18  
 
(1) The beach is safe 
(2) The children are safe 
(3) The shovel is safe 
 
The readings of ‘safe’ are different in the three sentences, in the sense that different properties 
are ascribed to the subject of these sentences. We can represent the properties with subscripts 
(associated with a very rough informal gloss) :  
 
(1*) The beach is safe1 (no harmful event is likely to take place there) 
(2*) The children are safe2 (they can’t be harmed) 
(3*) The shovel is safe3 (no harm can result from its use) 
 
These readings, however, result from interpretive processes which can also generate other 
readings, by rearranging the contextual assignment of values to the roles in the semantic 
frame associated with ‘safe’ (the RISK frame).19 As Fauconnier and Turner point out, it is 
possible to generate a range of distinct readings for any one of the sentences (1) to (3),  by 
manipulating the context and especially the topic situation. For example, the shovel in (3) can 
be ‘safe’ not because it is likely to cause no harm to the child who is using it (safe3), but 
because it is unbreakable and therefore protected from harm caused by the child (safe2). 
Different properties are ascribed to the shovel on these two readings : the shovel may be safe 
in one sense but not in the other sense. Similarly, sentence (1) can take several readings, as 
illustrated by the following examples : 
 
(1*)  The beach is safe1. Our stuff can be left unattended. 
(1**)  The beach is safe2 . The judge has just declared the development project illegal, 
so our favourite spot will not be destroyed after all. 
 (1***) The beach is safe4, we can’t lose money on that thanks to the Mayor, but the 
hotel is risky. 
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  This example comes from Fauconnier and Turner (2002 : 25-27). 
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  On the RISK frame, see Fillmore and Atkins (1992). 
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Which reading we get for (1) depends on which role in the frame the subject of the 
sentence is assigned to : the LOCATION role (the role of the place where HARM can occur), as 
in (1*) ; the VICTIM role (the entity that is harmed), as in (1**) ; or the role of the ACTION from 
which HARM may follow, as in (1***). This last reading is hard to get because the DP ‘the 
beach’ does not literally refer to an action, but the meaning of the noun ‘beach’ can be 
adjusted to that reading through ‘modulation’ (Recanati 2004, 2010). In (1***),‘the beach’ is 
understood metonymically as referring e.g. to the beach development project, a project which 
may be said to be safe in the sense that carrying it out (an action) involves no risk of losing 
money. ‘The hotel’ also refers metonymically to the hotel project, a project that might 
generate losses more easily than the beach project. 
There are other readings for these sentences, corresponding to other roles in the RISK 
frame (e.g. the ASSET role — the entity whose loss constitutes the harm). Moreover, as one 
might expect, the readings multiply as the number of arguments increases. Thus the following 
sentence, containing a transitive verb associated with the RISK frame, gives rise to 
seven distinct readings : 
  
(4) John risked a trip into the jungle 
 
Which reading we get for (4) depends upon whether John is the VICTIM or the ACTOR (or both) 
and whether ‘a trip to the jungle’ is seen as the HARM, as the ACTION from which HARM may 
result, as the ASSET that one does not want to lose. When the subject is the actor, the verb 
means ‘take risk’ rather than ‘run risk’, and the question arises whether the victim is the actor 
or someone else. 
Let us return to the main issue. We ascribe different properties to the shovel depending 
on the interpretation we choose for ‘safe’ in the sentence ‘the shovel is safe’. That is what I 
mean when I say that the predicate safe1 is distinct from the predicates safe2 and safe3. But 
these distinct predicates all result from an operation on the same frame. The word ‘safe’ 
contributes the RISK frame, together with a negative component (safety is the absence of risk). 
The frame is not a predicate but a schematic, determinable representation of a situation-type, 
to be made determinate in the interpretation process. On the view I am arguing for, the 
predicates that are ascribed in context to e.g. the shovel are generated as a by-product of the 
process of making the schematic representation of a situation type determinate. To make it 
determinate, values are assigned to roles in the frame, drawn from two main sources : the 
context (including the topic situation), and the other constituents in the sentence, whose 
values are linked to the frame. 
Which role the value of a given constituent may be assigned to is constrained by the 
grammar, but a good deal of latitute remains, which provides an entry-point for speaker’s 
meaning. Thus in (3), as I pointed out, the shovel may play either the role of VICTIM or the 
role of HARMFUL ENTITY. In a remote context it could play the LOCATION role, which the 
beach plays in (1*). It could play also the ASSET role (if the shovel is a solid gold 5th century 
tool which has just been unearthed and put into a safe). It must be acknowledged that, in some 
sense, the meaning of ‘safe’ varies depending on the interpretation we choose : we ascribe 
different properties to the shovel, so distinct truth-conditions are generated. But the lexical 
meaning of ‘safe’ does not vary. What varies is what I have called the ‘occasion meaning’ 
(Recanati 2010). I conclude that we must posit two distinct semantic levels here, just as we do 
for indexicals. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
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The Determination Thesis is inseparable from a general picture of the relation between 
linguistic meaning and utterance content, which we can represent as follows : 
 
Linguistic meaning + context  semantic content 
Semantic content + context  speech act content 
 
It is a familiar and widespread picture. Linguistic meaning determines semantic content in 
context, in a rule-governed manner. Speaker’s meaning comes into the picture after semantic 
content, at the level of speech act content. The overall content of the speech act (including its 
implicatures) depends upon what is said and the context in which it is said. What is said also 
is context-dependent, but the context-dependence of semantic content is supposed to be 
context-dependence of a different kind. Semantic content is supposed to depend on properties 
of the situation of utterance that are, by and large, independent of speaker’s meaning and 
speech act content.  
Demonstratives, I argued, are clear counterexamples to that picture. The value 
assigned to a demonstrative is an object determined by an act of speaker’s reference. More 
generally, assertoric content turns out to rest on speaker’s meaning, at various levels. 
Predication, reference and quantification all involve speaker’s meaning and cannot proceed 
without it. So the distinction between semantic content and speech act content is shakier than 
people tend to realize. 
Contrary to Fregean orthodoxy, I have argued that assertion — the illocutionary act 
performed by the speaker — itself plays a role in shaping assertoric content. Just as in the 
theory of thought, we need to distinguish two levels of content for utterances. Assertion 
consists in presenting a (relativized or classical) proposition as true with respect to some 
‘topic situation’. The content to be evaluated at the topic situation corresponds to Kaplan’s 
‘what is said’, or to my ‘lekton’ (Recanati 2007). It is not the full assertoric content. The full 
assertoric content is determined when the relevant situation of evaluation is fixed by speaker’s 
meaning. It is this mechanism which Kaplan describes in the case of tensed utterances : the 
kaplanian content is a temporal proposition, but the utterance is true iff the temporal 
proposition in question is true at the relevant time (the time of utterance). The time and world 
of utterance come into the picture when the assertion is made and the content of the utterance 
is applied to the relevant circumstance. 
Kaplan takes the kaplanian content to be the compositional ‘semantic value’ of the 
sentence (with respect to context), but this view has been criticized as resting on an 
inappropriate semantics for variables. Rabern argues that the semantic value of a variable is 
not the object assigned to that variable, as in Kaplan’s framework, but a function from 
assignments to values. The object assigned to the variable is only its assertoric content. As 
Rabern puts it, ‘the lesson to draw from looking at the embedding behavior of context-
sensitive (and assignment-sensitive) expressions is that the assertoric content of an expression 
need not be identified with the compositional semantic value of an expression’ (p. 16). 
I agree with Rabern that we should demote kaplanian contents from the role of 
compositional semantic value. Given that semantic values are what compositional semantics 
assigns to expressions, and given that compositional semantics is that branch of linguistics 
which deals with the linguistic meaning of expressions, we should equate semantic value and 
linguistic meaning, instead of positing a context-dependent semantic value, as Kaplan does. In 
this respect, Lewisian semantic values fare better than kaplanian contents. But that does not 
mean that we should dispense with kaplanian contents altogether, as Lewis suggests, or that 
we should equate kaplanian content and assertoric content, as Rabern suggests. 
The kaplanian content of an utterance corresponds to the property of situations which, 
in asserting the sentence, one ascribes to the topic situation. The full assertoric content 
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depends, in addition, upon the selection of a particular situation as topic situation. On this 
picture we need kaplanian contents not because they play the role of compositional semantic 
value, but because they play a role in the theory of assertion. Lewis himself has something 
akin to kaplanian content in his framework : the property which the subject self-ascribes. That 
property is the content of the de se assertion, but the full assertoric content goes beyond that, 
as we have seen : the de se assertion is correct if and only if the subject herself has the self-
ascribed property 
Although I have talked about levels of content at great length (both for utterances and 
thoughts), the main claim of the paper has been that, in the analysis of language, we should 
give up the Determination Thesis. Doing so encourages us to neatly separate content from 
semantic value, to appreciate that distinct constraints apply to them, and to acknowledge the 
role of pragmatics in the generation of the former from the latter. 
On the view I advocate, semantic values are linguistic meanings (as they are for 
Lewis); so, in addition to the Compositionality constraint, they satisfy the Modularity 
constraint : they can be calculated simply in virtue of one’s knowledge of the language (Borg 
2004). Neither Kaplanian contents nor assertoric contents can be semantic values if that 
constraint holds, for they depend upon speaker’s meaning and can’t be calculated in 
abstraction from the pragmatics. 
Contents, in general, don’t satisfy the Modularity constraint which semantic values 
ought to satisfy, but they satisfy another constraint, which semantic values do not satisfy. That 
is the Availability constraint (Recanati 1993, 2002, 2004): while semantic values may be 
‘cognized’ by anyone who masters the language, they are arguably too abstract to serve as 
object of thought at the personal level. Understanding a sentence, at the personal level, 
involves more than merely accessing the abstract meaning of the sentence (something that 
takes place at the sub-personal level) : personal level understanding always depends upon the 
activation of mental files in acts of speaker’s reference (Recanati 2012, forthcoming a),20 and 
a linking operation binding the files to roles in the frames evoked by lexical items of the 
predicative variety. This bridges the gap between utterances and thoughts. For thoughts 
themselves are best analysed as involving structured conceptual representations, over which 
the two levels of content we need for thoughts can be defined (Recanati forthcoming b).
21
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